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COMMENTS
MINIMIZING SECTION 16 (b) LIABILITY FOR BENEFICIAL
OWNERS-TWO-STEP TRANSACTIONS
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,
404 U.S. 418 (1972)
Emerson Electric Company attempted to gain control of Dodge
Manufacturing Company by acquiring 13.2 percent of Dodge common
stock on June 16, 1967, at $63 per share. On August 22, Emerson's ef-
fort to acquire control of Dodge was thwarted by the approval by
Dodge shareholders of a plan to merge Dodge with Reliance Electric
Company. On August 28, Emerson sold 37,000 shares of Dodge stock
at S68 per share, thereby reducing its holdings to 9.96 percent of the out-
standing shares. Emerson sold its remaining shares to Dodge at $69
per share on September 11. Emerson's counsel recommended this two-
step disposition as a means of minimizing the company's liability under
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 Predicating
its demand on section 16(b), the merged corporation demanded that
Emerson pay to it the profit from both sales. In a declaratory judg-
ment action brought by Emerson, the district court held Emerson liable
for the profit on both sales.' The United States Court of Appeals for
I. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 420 (1972). See 15
U.S.C., 78p(b) (1970):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period less than six months . . . shall
inure to and be receivable by the issuer, irrespective of any intentions on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer, in entering into such
transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the se-
curity sold for a period exceeding six months. . . . This subsection shall not
be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the se-
curity involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection.
2. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
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the Eighth Circuit reversed as to the liability for the profit on the second
sale.' The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held: When
the owner of more than ten percent of the outstanding registered shares
of a corporation disposes of the stock in two sales, the first of which
reduces his holdings below ten percent, he incurs no liability under
section 16(b) for the profit realized on the second sale.'
In order to protect the investing public, the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 regulates securities transactions and prohibits the use of
fraud and manipulation in securities trading.5 Section 16(b) was de-
signed to promote an "honest market" and to prevent the misuse of
privileged information" by denying insiders profit from "short-swing"
transactions. 8 The statute imposes strict liability on certain transac-
tions without regard to proof of actual possession or use of inside infor-
mation.9 An insider, that is, an officer, director, or the beneficial owner
3. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970). Em-
erson never contested liability for the first sale.
4. Because only the merged corporation sought certiorari, only the liability for the
profit on the September sale was at issue before the Supreme Court.
5. The introductory section of the 1934 Act explains the legislative intent. 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Loss suggests that the 1934 Act has four purposes: "to afford
a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford
remedies for fraud in securities trading and the manipulation of the market; to regulate
the securities market; and to control the amount of the nation's credit which goes into
these markets." 1 L. Loss, ScuriaEs REGULATIONS 130-31 (2d ed. 1966). See Thill
Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970); Beck v.
SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1970); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.
N.Y. 1968).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970). See also Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
7. At the congressional hearings prior to the enactment of the 1934 Act, corpo-
rate insiders described common practices of abuse of insider information. S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33, 47, 68 (1934). See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reli-
ance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 1970); Booth v. Varian Associates, 334
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949).
8. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 420 (1972); Heli-Coil
Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 170 (3d Cir. 1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d
342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958).
9. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gambel-Skogmolo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th
Cir. 1965); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo.
1969). Thus one who trades within six months need not intend to utilize inside infor-
mation nor must he necessarily possess any to be liable. See 72 HAav. L. REV. 1392
(1959) for criticism of this § 16(b) strict liability. For a general explanation, see Note,
Section 16(b): Re-Evaluation is Needed, 25 U. MIAMI L. RV. 144 (1970); 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1012 (1971); 41 TEx. L. REV. 448 (1963); 111 U. PA. L. REv. 688, 689 (1963);
18 WEST. REs. L. REv. 986 (1967). See also B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1964); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951); Smolowe v.
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of more than ten percent of a corporation's stock, 10 who purchases and
sells stock or vice-versa within a six month period must return any
profit to the corporation." The insider, however, who has held stock
for more than six months may sell or buy on the basis of inside infor-
mation without incurring liability under section 16(b).12 The section
primarily aims at the insider who acquires information, buys or sells
before that information is publicly available, and then restores his posi-
tion after the market has reacted to the news.' 3
Section 16(b) treats ten percent owners differently from other in-
siders when the shareholders are not ten percent owners at both ends of
the transaction, explicitly providing that, "[Tihis subsection shall not be
construed to cover any transactions where such beneficial owner was
not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and pur-
chase."'" Though courts have interpreted section 16(b) to imply that
directors and officers are liable even if they do not hold their office at
both ends of the short-swing transaction,1 the Reliance court, considering
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Abrams
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For this reason, it
has been said the law operates as a "crude rule of thumb." This often repeated phrase
was made by the chief spokesman for the draftsmen of the 1934 Act. See Hearings on
Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934). See also 2 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 1040-44. The element
of strict liability enables one to recover easily in many instances, since cases reading
the statute literally require no proof of possession or use of inside information. For
cases dealing with factual situations which did not lend themselves to abuse of such in-
formation, see Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966); Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958); Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970).
10. The ten percent requirement does not apply to officers and directors. These
corporate officials have enough opportunity to obtain inside information without own-
ing a particular percentage of corporate stock; they are insiders by virtue of their office.
To be subject to § 16(b) liability, a beneficial owner's holdings can be any class of
equity security registered on the national exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
11. The time period of six months was chosen because Congress believed that the
temptation for an insider is greatest within a short period of time. See Blau v. Max
Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1965).
12. He might, however, be liable under other sections of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, such as § 10(b). This liability would not be premised upon the short-
swing nature of the transaction.
13. The classic case is the director who has inside knowledge that the corporation
is about to suspend dividend payments. He sells a large block of shares, announces
the omitted dividend, and then restores his holdings at the depressed market value.
See 73 HARv. L. REv. 1630 (1960).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
15. For cases holding officers and directors liable for short-swing transactions al-
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the explicit language of 16(b), held that ten percent beneficial owners
are not liable unless they hold ten percent at both ends of the transac-
tion.1 6
In Reliance, the Supreme Court applied the beneficial owner exclu-
sion of section 16(b) to a split sale without questioning the reasons
behind separate treatment of officers and directors on the one hand
and beneficial owners on the other. In Adler v. Klawans,17 however,
the Second Circuit explained that Congress intended to treat beneficial
owners differently from officers and directors because "officers and di-
rectors have more ready access to the intimate business secrets of cor-
porations and factors which can affect the real and ultimately the mar-
ket value of stock than does even so large a stockholder as a '10%
beneficial owner.' "'s The Adler court stated that this reasoning is
supported by experience and furnishes an adequate basis for the prefer-
ential treatment of ten percent owners. 19
The Reliance decision results in equal treatment of shareholders
owning less than ten percent of the shares at one end of the transac-
tion, regardless of whether there had been a series of transactions reduc-
ing the holdings to less than ten percent. It may be argued that failing
to take into account the sales reducing holdings to less than ten percent
defeats the congressional purpose behind the Act,20 but the Court in
though not in office at both the time of purchase and sale, see Feder v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 808 (1970); Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Bershad v. McDonough, 300 F. Supp. 1051
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also 44 B.U.L. REv. 598
(1969); 1969 DUKE L.J. 812 (1969); 21 U. PIrr. L. REv. 551 (1960); 22 VAND. L.
REV. 1003 (1969).
The same is true with stocks unlisted on the exchange at one end of the transaction.
See Perfect Photo, Inc. v. Grabb, 205 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1962); See also 49
VA. L. REv. 347 (1963). Apparently, this issue has never been decided at the circuit
court level.
16. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972).
17. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
18. Id. at 845.
19. It is interesting to note that the court gave no authority for its conclusions, but
did assert, without clarification, that there are important exceptions to the rule that
officers and directors have more access to factors affecting market value than ten
percent beneficial owners. See generally Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d
299 (10th Cir. 1956); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943); 2 L.
Loss, supra note 5, at 1060, 1061. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp. limited the
applicability of the separate treatment of beneficial owners by holding that one becomes
a beneficial owner at the very moment one's holdings are increased to ten percent.
20. There have been two lines of decisions interpreting § 16(b). See Bateman,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss1/12
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Reliance specifically ruled that Congress intended the statute to set up
a literal standard and that to impose 16(b) liability on this transaction
would "flatly contradict the words of the statute."'" It is unlikely that
preferential treatment of ten percent beneficial owners will defeat the
congressional intent, since most ten percent owners come under insider
liability as officers or directors of the company even if a multi-transac-
tion share reduction is undertaken. In addition, perhaps Congress be-
lieved that being a beneficial owner in itself entails less freedom of ac-
cess to inside information than that allowed to directors and officers,
and did not wish to discourage investment in the midst of the Great
Depression by unnecessarily exposing stockholders to liability.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Reliance, believes that the congres-
sional purpose requiring that the beneficial owner be such an owner at
both ends of the transaction was intended to exclude from liability only
those who became ten percent holders involuntarily.22 If, however,
The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for Clarification, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 772 (1971):
In the early cases which interpreted section 16(b) for the first time, the courts
adopted an extremely literal and often harsh interpretation of its provisions,
which has since come to be known as the objective method. For many
years, this was the generally accepted method of interpretation. In later cases
which presented even more difficult issues, however, the courts gradually
began to move to a more pragmatic or subjective approach to the interpreta-
tion of 16(b), which has placed relatively more emphasis on the policy of the
statute and less on its literal terms.
With Reliance, the Supreme Court has apparently adopted an objective approach.
For cases adopting this objective, or literal, approach to § 16(b) liability, see Heli-
Coil v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1951 ); Park and Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). For dis-
cussion of this method of interpretation, see Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1958); Hei-Coil v. Webster, supra; Bateman, supra; Lowenfels, Section 16(b):
A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (1968); 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 1034, 1036 (1969).
For cases adopting the subjective, or expansive, approach to § 16(b) liability, see
Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970); Feder v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 808 (1970); Petteys v.
Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966);
Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).
Although the Supreme Court interprets the statute literally in finding Emerson not
liable, the Court probably would have reached the same result if the subjective ap-
proach had been employed, for there was little chance of abuse of inside information
since Emerson's sole concern was liquidation of its stock after the abortive merger
attempt.
21. 404 U.S. at 427.
22. The dissent, arguing that the congressional purpose demands that corporate
217
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Congress had intended to limit the exception in this manner, it could
have done so in a much clearer provision. Moreover, given the over-
all purpose of the statute, to prohibit unfair use of inside information
only under specified circumstances, it seems unlikely that Congress
would have limited the exception to this instance.28
Factually, the circumstances in this case were somewhat unique in
that Emerson had no inside information and only decided to sell the
shares so quickly when its attempted takeover of Dodge was thwarted.
The Court failed to indicate what influence, if any, these factors had on
its decision. Since other traders will be encouraged to adopt tech-
niques similar to those of Emerson, the Court should have provided
reasons for the statutory preferential treatment of beneficial sharehold-
ers in general and explained its treatment of the split sale situation in
light of these reasons.
insiders should not be able to avoid liability imposed by § 16(b) so easily, suggested
that "sale" should be construed to include any plan formulated within six months of
any purchase made during the period in which the purchaser is a beneficial owner.
This would create a presumption that any purchase and sale within six months is part
of a single plan of disposition and should be subject to § 16(b) liability. This interpre-
tation would mean that Emerson's second sale would be considered as part of the first;
thus Emerson would be liable for all short-swing profits under § 16(b). Reliance Elec.
Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 427 (1972).
23. See notes 6 and 8 supra for the general purpose of § 16(b). See also Note,
Section 16(b): Re-Evaluation Is Needed, 25 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 144 (1970).
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